Jul 2, 2010

It’s a small economy (formerly world) after all.

On Thursday I attributed the failure of The New York Times’ hyperlocal project in New Jersey to a bad business model. Its reliance on unpaid labor meant there was no need to generate revenue, which proved to be its Achilles’ heel when the volunteers and student interns didn’t materialize.

I still think this model sucked, but it wasn’t just a bad business model. It was the wrong business model for that area. Here’s why.

To keep the New Jersey Local running, The Times would have needed a large pool of unpaid student interns. They have that for their New York hyperlocal sites, with more than 480,000 students in the City University system, which includes a J-school and at least two colleges with strong writing programs. CUNY’s J-school already mans the Brooklyn Local, while students from New York University’s journalism program will work the upcoming East Village Local in Manhattan.

The Local didn’t have that in its New Jersey beat, which covered Maplewood, Millburn and South Orange in Essex County. Seton Hall University sits in the middle of South Orange but has an enrollment of only 10,000 students. Nearby Montclair State University has 18,000 students, and the Newark campus of Rutgers University has 11,500 students. There wasn’t enough wiggle room for error or missed partnerships.

The take-home lesson from the New Jersey Local experiment is this: Hyperlocal business models aren’t always about scale. What works in a large market won’t necessarily shrink to fit a small market. Instead, hyperlocalists must put attention into their beats’ microeconomies. If a neighborhood can’t support a news outlet’s business  model, then that model needs revision.

For example, my former hyperlocal site’s business model relied on advertising revenue. However, my coverage area was underdeveloped as far as businesses and services go — advertisers didn’t exist, and The Great Recession didn’t help. On the flip side (and contrary to what was happening across the larger region), the neighborhood had plenty of homeowners’ associations unaffected by the mortgage crisis and very active in civic affairs.

My for-profit company spent three years trying to tap blood from the advertising stone. It would have been better off as a nonprofit funded through donations from those homeowners’ associations. Woulda, coulda, shoulda.

Scale does not equal sustainability or solvency. That goes for The New York Times and independent hyperlocal outlets. But an appreciation for what a neighborhood can support will go a long way.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user pillowhead designs.

Jul 1, 2010

Why did The New York Times fail in New Jersey?

As I’ve mentioned previously, I have a love-hate relationship with The New York Times — love the writing, hate the elitist aftertaste.

Thus it was with both sadness and schadenfreude that I learned Wednesday of the demise of its hyperlocal project “The Local” in northern New Jersey. Just like that, The Times pulled the plug on The Local’s coverage of Maplewood, Millburn and South Orange and dumped its archive on hyperlocal pioneer BaristaNet, Business Insider reported.

Why did The Times’ “experiment” fail in New Jersey when it’s met some success in Brooklyn and is expanding into Manhattan’s East Village? What happened?

The way I see it, the New Jersey Local was hit with a one-two punch as it swaggered out of its corner. First, the news site saw editorial turnover in December, twelve months into what would eventually be a 15-month run. It can’t be easy for any news enterprise to recover from that kind of blow so early in its operations.

More troublesome (to me, anyway) was its business plan. The website’s goal was to rely on volunteer writers and unpaid student interns for its content. The Times already leans on students from CUNY’s J-school and New York University to fuel its Local sites in New York, yet it couldn’t ink a deal with Seton Hall University, which sits smack in the middle of what was the New Jersey Local’s South Orange beat.

In the end, “it couldn’t find the right partnership,” Times associate managing editor Jim Schachter told Business Insider. On top of that, the Jersey website didn’t have the resources to hire a full-time reporter, Schachter added.

Of course it didn’t have the resources to pay a reporter. The Local had no intentions of paying its other contributors or student interns, and an unpaid labor force means no overhead and no need to create sustainable revenue streams. It never anticipated the need to hire someone when the volunteer pool ran dry and the student interns never materialized.

One might also make the argument that The Times left too heavy an editorial imprint on the Jersey Local. The Old Gray Lady has an uptight, institutional voice that works on Park Avenue but not necessarily on South Orange Avenue. Conversely, BaristaNet’s tone is more engaging and, arguably, better suited to local and hyperlocal coverage.

But don’t blame the Jersey Local’s demise on competition from AOL’s Patch affiliate. According to Compete.com, the Jersey Local had 19,635 unique visitors in May, compared with 7,745 for Patch’s South Orange site.

Image courtesy of Flickr user Zooomabooma.